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1 Introduction 
 
The effectiveness of fiscal policy in stimulating the real economy has been an active intellectual 
debate in academic journals and high profile columns at least since Keynes wrote his General Theory. 
Can an expansionary fiscal policy, an increase in government spending or a tax cut, boost output and 
consumption? If yes, by how much? These are not only key questions in macroeconomics and public 
finance but also questions that frequently confront policy makers. The recent fiscal stimulus packages 
embraced by many leading economies are deemed of as a necessary prescription to assuage the 
consequences of the current global economic slowdown (IMF Staff Note Position 2008; 2009). The 
environment of low interest rate close to the zero bound further heats the discussion. 
Economic theory has offered more than one prediction depending on the characteristics of the 
economy under consideration: Is it a “Neo-classical” or “Keynesian” world? Are consumers 
“Ricardian” or “non-Ricardian”? Is it a closed or an open economy? Modern dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium models have different implications than standard Keynesian theory. Answers 
differ not only with respect to the size of the effect but also in some cases with respect to the direction 
of the effect. The theoretical debate seems not to reach a consensus due to a lack of persuasive 
empirical evidence. Econometric studies, employing Vector Autoregression (VAR) analysis, have 
offered mixed support. The crucial difficulty with this regard is the identification of the effects of the 
change in fiscal policy isolating all other effects.  
This essay surveys the literature, the theoretical strand and recent econometric (VAR) findings, 
on the short-run effects of discretionary fiscal policy on macroeconomic aggregates. The main theme 
of this survey is that the recent advances in economic modelling and econometric techniques do not, 
thus far, completely resolve the protracted debate on the size of the multiplier and qualitative response 
of consumption, the real exchange rate and other key variables.   
Undoubtedly, discussing fiscal policy involves many important aspects that are beyond the 
scope of this essay. Examples are the sustainability of fiscal policy, Wickens (2008, chapter 5) and 
Uctum and Wickens (2000), the intergenerational aspect of the public debt burden, Auerbach (2009), 
and the role of automatic stabilisers (i.e. the propensity of some components of the government budget 
such as corporate taxes and unemployment benefits to smooth the business cycle), Auerbach and 
Freenberg (2000) and van den Noord (2000).  
This essay proceeds as follows. Section two provides an overview of the predictions of 
economic theory on the effects of a fiscal policy shift on key macroeconomic variables. Section three 
summarises recent econometric methodologies and findings while section four concludes. 
  
2 Theoretical overview  
 
In examining the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy one crucial assumption of any model is 
whether or not agents are forward looking. In the absence of micro-founded forward looking 
behaviour, expected future changes have no effects on current period decisions whereas forward 
looking consumers, armed with rational expectations, do react in the current period to expected 
changes in future variables. The following two subsections provide an overview of theoretical 
predictions distinguishing between models with and without a micro-founded forward looking 
behaviour. 
 
2.1 Theories without micro-founded forward looking behaviour 
 
In the Classical model in which prices are fully flexible and the supply curve is vertical, there is no 
role for fiscal policy. In the other boundary world, the Keynesian model, illustrated by the 
undergraduate IS-LM and Mundell-Fleming analyses, prices are sticky and current consumption 
depends on current income with no role for expected future income. In this world, an expansionary 
fiscal policy can stimulate the economy with multiple effects. The mechanism by which these effects 
occur depends on the degree of openness and the embraced exchange rate regime of the economy.  
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In a closed economy, for a given money supply, an increase in government spending 
stimulates economic activity increasing output. Since money demand depends on income, the increase 
in output raises the interest rate, which in turns partially crowds out private investment. The degree of 
crowding out depends on the sensitivity of private investment to income and the interest rate. The final 
effect of the expansion is an increase in output, total investment and consumption. A fiscal expansion 
in the form of a tax cut boosts private consumption leading to an increase in aggregate demand and 
output. Also in this case, like the expansion of government spending, the resulting increase in the 
interest rate partially crowds out private investment. Hence, the effects of a tax cut are qualitatively the 
same as the increase in government spending. The tax multiplier however is smaller than the 
government-spending multiplier since a part of the increase in disposable income will be saved and 
not directly spent. 
  In a small open economy with a flexible exchange rate regime, a fiscal expansion puts 
upward pressure on the interest rate. If capital is perfectly mobile and the interest rate is fixed at the 
world level, capital flows into the economy increasing the demand for the domestic currency. As a 
result, the nominal exchange rate appreciates. Because prices are sticky, the nominal appreciation is 
mapped to a real exchange rate appreciation. Consequently, net exports decline. This negative effect 
on the trade balance offsets the expansionary effect of fiscal policy. Thus, according to this setting, 
fiscal policy in small open economies with a flexible exchange rate regime is ineffective. While a 
small open economy cannot affect the rest of the world, the case of a large open economy lies between 
the two polar cases of a closed and a small open economy. In an open economy with a fixed exchange 
rate regime, fiscal expansion puts upward pressure on the exchange rate and interest rate. Money 
supply increases to defend the fixed exchange rate parity. The final effect is an increase in output. 
Hence, fiscal policy under this scenario is effective in stimulating output.  
In an integrated world, domestic fiscal policy can affect foreign economies, particularly in the 
case of a currency union; i.e. a multi-country Mundell-Fleming model with a fixed exchange rate 
regime. Fiscal policy externalities may arise in opposite directions. The increase in domestic output 
will lead to additional imports from trading partners boosting the income of the trading partners (trade 
channel). At the same time, the initial upward pressure on the domestic interest rate attracts foreign 
capital including capital from other members of the currency union. Hence, members’ interest rates are 
under upward pressure. As a result, the union-wide interest rate may rise. This in turns has a 
contractionary effect on output (interest rate channel). Additionally, the exchange rate of the union 
currency is floating with the rest of the world. If the fiscal expansion in a (large) member economy 
causes an appreciation to the real exchange rate with the rest of the world, as the Mundell-Flemming 
model predicts, the expansionary effects will be dampened due to worsening trade balance. Yet, the 
theoretical reasoning assumes that one country implements a fiscal stimulus plan, possibly in response 
to a country-specific negative shock, while ignoring the policy of the rest of the world. In an 
environment of an international economic downturn (a common global shock), one might argue in 
favour of a collective fiscal effort. As mentioned above, the effects of fiscal stimuli in highly open 
economies can be retarded by the appreciation of the real exchange rate and the deterioration of the 
trade balance. Coordinated fiscal actions among trading partners can reduce the bill of the country-
specific fiscal stimulus and eliminate free-riding possibilities.1 
 
2.2 Theories with micro-founded forward looking behaviour 
 
The analysis presented in the previous section is not based on micro-founded behaviours. 
Macroeconomic theory is increasingly building on Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) 
models to derive micro-founded intertemporal aggregate relations that explain the factors behind 
economic fluctuations. Typically, DSGE models incorporate forward looking agents and rational 
expectations. The modelling strategy is as follows: All agents in the model follow optimal plans. 
Consumers maximise lifetime expected utility subject to the budget constraint. Firms maximise profits 
subject to the available technology, and the government has to satisfy the government budget 
constraint. To solve the model, usually, the resulting optimisation conditions together with the 
equilibrium conditions are linearised around the steady state (perturbation).2 The final solution of the 
                                                 
1 See IMF Staff Note Position 2008. 
2 Some models are closed by solving the non-linear system (projection). 
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model can be summarised by a set of linear equations. The economy in these models is subject to 
stochastic disturbances, which are named “shocks”. A disturbance to a fiscal variable, government 
spending or taxes, is a fiscal shock. In order to study the dynamics of the variables following a shock, 
the model' parameters are calibrated and/or estimated. Calibration means assigning values for the 
parameters based on microeconometric evidence or theoretical justifications.  
Two important assumptions distinguish between two types of DSGE models: The Real 
Business Cycle (RBC) model in which prices are flexible and perfect competition prevails in all 
markets and the New Keynesian (NK) models with sticky prices and imperfect competition. The 
following two subsections survey the role of fiscal policy in both types of models. The setup and 
solution techniques of DSGE models can be found in details in DeJong and Dave (2007), Galí (2008), 
McCandless (2008) and Woodford (2003). 
 
2.2.1 Fiscal policy in Real Business Cycle models 
 
RBC models primarily focus on the role of real shocks, such as technology and preferences shocks, in 
explaining economic fluctuations. Rebelo (2005) presents an overview of RBC models. The analysis 
of fiscal policy in a RBC setup can be found for examples in Baxter and King (1992), Burnside, 
Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher 
(1999) and Ohanian (1997). 
In a prototypical RBC model, government spending is financed by lump-sum taxes. The 
forward looking consumer understands that additional government purchases in the current period 
have to be financed by taxes in the future. Therefore, an increase in government spending reduces the 
household wealth by increasing the present value of household tax liabilities (negative wealth effect). 
As a result, consumption declines while interest rate, saving and labour supply increase. The rise in 
hours worked in turn causes real wages to fall whereas investment and output increase. This described 
fiscal policy transmission is in force whether the rise in government spending is permanent or 
persistent but not permanent; Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004). The intuition behind the 
increase in investment is that the higher steady state level of hours worked requires initially higher 
investment to build up additional capital stock; Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999). If the 
increase in government spending is very temporarily, investment goes down to smooth consumption. 
The response of private consumption to the increase in government spending is independent of 
the financing tool. Permanent income is the same with a tax-financed or a debt-financed expansion; i.e. 
Ricardian equivalence holds. Burnside et al. (2004) show that the effects of distortionary taxes are 
qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the effects of lump-sum taxes except for some differences 
concerning the timing of the peak response. Further, in a modified version of the model, Burnside et al. 
(2004) introduce investment adjustment costs and habit persistence in private consumption.3 This 
modified version of the model mutes, but not completely, the negative effect of the shock on 
consumption and generates a hump shaped response for investment.  
The classical open economy treatment of RBC models by Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994) 
focuses on the dynamics of the terms-of-trade and the trade balance following a technology shock. 
Other studies are mainly concerned with the implied properties of the international business cycle and 
correlation patterns between key variables. Cardia (1991) finds a very small role of fiscal shocks in 
explaining output volatility in a small open economy.  
Thus, in contrast to the Keynesian prediction, RBC models predict a negative effect of fiscal 
expansion on consumption, albeit a positive effect on output.  
 
2.2.2 Fiscal policy in Neo-Keynesian (NK) models 
 
The NK DSGE framework adopts the RBC modelling strategy of deriving micro-founded aggregate 
relations, but fundamentally differs in assuming monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities. A 
                                                 
3 Habit persistence in consumption states that consumers do not derive utility from the level of consumption but 
rather from relative consumption. If the period utility function without habit persistence is u(Ct) where Ct is 
consumption in period t, habit persistence implies a period utility function of the form u(Ct-aCt-1) where the 
parameter “a” captures the intensity of habit persistence. See Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2008) for an 
overview of different formations of habit persistence. 
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particular interest of this class of models is the study of monetary policy; Christiano, Eichenbaum and 
Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003). 
Analysing fiscal policy in a standard NK DSGE model generally gives similar predictions to 
those of a prototypical RBC model: an increase in output and a decrease in consumption; Linnemann 
and Schabert (2003). This is due to the negative wealth effect of a fiscal expansion resulting from the 
embedded forward looking behaviour of households in both types of models. The labour market reacts 
differently, though. As stressed by Pappa (2009a), in contrast to the RBC prediction, real wages in a 
NK model increase after a positive shock to government consumption. This is because the resulting 
increase in output raises the demand for labour which in a NK setup offsets the increase in the labour 
supply due to the negative wealth effect.  
Many NK DSGE models do not include capital (short-run models), and therefore refrain from 
fully modelling private investment decisions. In models with capital accumulation, an increase in 
government spending raises the interest rate and crowds out private investment. Christiano, 
Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2009) show that when the zero bound of the nominal interest rate is strictly 
binding, the positive effect of an increase in government spending on output raises expected inflation. 
This in turn causes a decline in the real interest rate. In such economy, the government spending 
multiplier is relatively large. 
Thus, in its simplest form, a NK DSGE model misses the Keynesian prediction of a positive 
effect of a fiscal expansion on consumption. Furthermore, Monacelli and Perotti (forthcoming) show 
that an increase in government spending in a standard open economy DSGE model typically causes an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate and worsens the trade balance. As it is revealed in the next 
section however, there are empirical studies that report a positive impact on consumption coupled with 
a depreciation of the real exchange rate. Hence, many studies are apt to modify prototypical DSGE 
models particularly due to the responses of consumption and the real exchange rate. As regards fiscal 
policy externalities in a DSGE setup, Corsetti, Meier and Müller (2010) show in a two-country DSGE 
model that financing a fiscal expansion with a combination of an increase in taxes and a decrease in 
government spending in the medium-run enhances positive cross-border fiscal spillovers.   
 
2.3 The consumption controversy 
 
Broadly, there are four main modifications to DSGE models in order to get the Neo-Keynesian 
predictions in line with the Keynesian, and the RBC predictions in line with influential econometric 
evidence; that is generating a positive response of consumption.   
First, some models adopt a non-separable utility function in consumption and leisure. 
Linnemann (2006) applies this strategy in a RBC setup. This specification of preferences implies that 
consumption and leisure are substitutes. The negative wealth effect of the fiscal expansion raises hours 
worked, which decreases leisure. Consequently, the marginal utility of consumption increases. The 
household wants to work more and to consume more mitigating the negative wealth effect. As a result, 
in this model consumption, employment and output increase. However, as emphasised by Bilbiie 
(2009), the non-separable utility specification has the drawback that consumption increases only if it is 
an inferior good.  
A second method of generating a positive effect on consumption is to introduce habit 
persistence in consumption at the good level (so-called “deep habits”); Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé and 
Uribe (2006). Although this model does not include nominal rigidities, it departs from the standard 
RBC model by assuming monopolistic competition in goods markets. In this model, the mark-up of 
price over the marginal cost inversely depends on the price elasticity of demand, which is in the 
presence of deep habits related to aggregate demand. The spending shock stimulates aggregate 
demand and labour supply. Firms reduce the mark-ups and increase labour demand. The increase in 
labour demand over-offsets the increase in labour supply. Real wages rise. The value of leisure in 
terms of consumption declines. The final effect is an increase in output and consumption. Time variant 
mark-ups are the driving engine of the positive effect on consumption in the presence of deep habits. 
In a standard DSGE model, mark-ups are time invariant. Closely linked to the contribution of Ravn et 
al. (2006) is the study by Bouakez and Rebei (2007) who allow households’ preferences in a RBC 
model to exhibit habit persistence in consumption and to depend on government spending. In this 
model, the marginal utility of consumption increases after a government spending shock because 
private and public spending are complements.   
 6
Third, some NK DSGE models include two types of households: Ricardian households and 
“rule-of-thumb” (or non-Ricardian) households who consume all of their current income; Coenen and 
Straub (2005) and Galí, Vallés and López-Salido (2007). This idea traces back to Campbell and 
Mankiw (1989) and Mankiw (2000). A non-Ricardian consumer can be deemed of as either a 
consumer who faces a binding borrowing constraint or an irrational consumer. In these models, the 
increase in real wages resulting from the positive shock to government spending leads the non-
Ricardian households to increase their consumption. Depending on the share of the non-Ricardian 
households in total households, the effect on aggregate consumption can be positive. For instance, 
Coenen and Straub (2005) and Forni, Monteforte and Sessa (2009) estimate this share in the Euro 
Area to be lower than 25 percent and between 30 and 40 percent, respectively. Campbell and Mankiw 
(1989) find that half of income in the US goes to rule-of-thumb consumers.  
Fourth, as argued by Corsetti, Meier and Müller (2009) an increase in current government 
spending may not only lead to an increase in future taxes but also to a decrease in future government 
spending (spending reversals). This spending reversal effect is modelled by allowing the dynamics of 
government spending to respond to the stock of public debt. Additionally, Corsetti et al. (2009) allow 
for non-Ricardian consumers. In this model, a fiscal shock coupled with anticipated spending reversal 
in a sticky price world increases output and consumption. 
 
2.4 The real exchange rate controversy 
 
In contrast to the findings of some econometric studies, Keynesian and DSGE models predict an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate following the fiscal expansion. A theoretical model that predicts 
the opposite is Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). In their two-country intertemporal model, the standard 
negative wealth effect on consumption does hold. As a result, an increase in government spending 
decreases the relative demand for domestic money and raises domestic prices. The purchasing power 
parity implies a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate.   
Monacelli and Perotti (forthcoming) however argue, based on econometric evidence, that the 
depreciation of the exchange rate must be associated with an increase and not a decrease in 
consumption. This result can be achieved by adopting non-separable preferences or the deep habit 
persistence (time variant mark-ups). Ravn et al. (2007) show in a model of deep habits that an 
anticipated government spending shock, on impact, decreases consumption and causes an appreciation 
of the real exchange rate, as in standard DSGE models, whereas an unanticipated government 
spending shock increases consumption and causes a depreciation of the real exchange rate.  
Monacelli and Perotti (forthcmoing) point out that the behaviour of non-Ricardian consumers 
does not determine the real exchange rate. Therefore, the inclusion of non-Ricardian consumers per se, 
although it generates a positive effect on consumption, does not generate a depreciation of the real 
exchange rate. In the spending reversal model of Corsetti, Meier and Müller (2009), the real exchange 
rate does depreciate while consumption increases after a fiscal expansion. 
Concerning other indicators of relative prices, Müller (2008) shows that in the presence of 
home bias in private and government consumption a government spending shock leads to an 
appreciation in the terms-of-trade (the relative price of imports). Additionally, net exports will increase 
if some elasticity conditions hold. In principle, home bias in consumption is the assumption behind the 
change in relative prices. Without a home bias, a change in consumption will not change relative 
prices and the terms-of-trade.  
Further, Monacelli and Perotti (2008) examine the response of the relative price of non-traded 
goods. Intuitively, if government consumption is more intensive in services (i.e. intensive in non-
traded goods) than private consumption is, an increase in government spending leads to an 
appreciation of the price of non-traded goods. Monacelli and Perotti (2008) show that the openness of 
the economy to international trade implies an increase in the price of non-traded goods after a 
government spending shock even if government spending is not more intensive in non-traded goods 
than private consumption is.  
The link between the budget balance and the current account, ultimately based on the national 
account identity, is frequently cited as the “twin deficit” hypothesis according to which an increase in 
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the budget deficit worsens the current account.4 Corsetti and Müller (2006) stress the role of openness 
to international trade in the reaction of domestic saving, investment, and hence the current account to 
changes in fiscal policy. Corsetti and Müller (2006) argue that a negative shock to the budget deficit 
worsens the current account only in rather open economies. Empirical support for the twin deficit 
hypothesis is reviewed in section three.   
 
2.5 Fiscal policy rules 
   
While the focus here is discretionary fiscal policy, there is a strand of literature that examines “optimal” 
fiscal policy rules. Reviewing this literature in details is beyond the scope of this essay. In essence, 
fiscal policy can be thought of as the commitment of fiscal authority to follow a certain rule. For 
example, Taylor (2000) presents a rule that expresses the actual fiscal balance as a function of output 
gap and structural fiscal balance. Committing to a fiscal rule implies that fiscal policy “automatically” 
responds to the state of the economy. A fiscal shock is a disturbance to the fiscal rule. The “optimal” 
rule is the rule that maximises the model’s welfare function. Additionally, in the presence of nominal 
rigidities, it is important to take into account the reaction of the monetary authority to fiscal policy. 
Accommodating monetary policy reduces the expansionary effects of fiscal policy. The DSGE 
literature is rich of studies that model the interaction of endogenously derived or exogenously assumed 
fiscal and monetary policy rules; for instance Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) and Adam and Billi 
(2008). Further, some studies derive the optimal policy mix particularly for a currency union; for 
example Beetsma and Jensen (2005), Galí and Monacelli (2008) and Ferreo (2009).  
 
2.6 Departing from the infinite horizon representative agent models 
 
The transmission mechanism of fiscal shocks may differ if we depart from modelling fiscal policy 
within the infinite horizon representative agent DSGE framework and consider instead a demographic 
structure of the economy. For example, when consumers have finite horizons the effects of a fiscal 
expansion depends on consumers' perceptions of the timing of the expected increase in future taxes 
(stabilisation programs). In the model of Sutherland (1998), at a low level of public debt the expected 
increase in taxes due to a current fiscal expansion is remote for the current generation allowing for 
short-run Keynesian expansionary effects. However, in the case of a fiscal expansion at a high level of 
public debt, current consumers expect an imminent increase in taxes within their lifetimes. Therefore, 
the fiscal expansion in this situation has a contractionary effect. A similar non-Keynesian effect is 
advocated by the hypothesis of “expansionary fiscal contraction” modelled by Devereux (2003) and 
Barry and Devereux (2005). According to this hypothesis, a credible permanent reduction in 
government consumption reduces expected future tax liabilities. Consumers in the current generation 
increase current consumption by less than future consumption. The real interest rate falls leading to 
higher levels of investment and output in the steady state.  
Despite the possibility of a non-Keynesian effect of fiscal policy, a Keynesian effect still can 
be found in models that combine demographic effects with market imperfections. For example, 
Ganelli (2007) and Ganelli (2005) consider overlapping generation models with sticky prices in a 
closed economy and an open economy setup respectively. Since the Ricardian equivalence does not 
hold in these models, a debt-financed tax cut increases households' wealth boosting private 
consumption and causing an appreciation of the real exchange rate in the short-run. Further, Farmer 
(forthcoming) derives a multi-generations micro-founded Keynesian model in which self-fulfilling 
loss of confidence in the value of assets lowers output and employment. In this model, an increase in 
government spending restores full employment and shifts the economy to a new equilibrium with a 
higher real interest rate and a higher income, but this stimulus is costly to future generations who incur 
higher taxes. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Recall the identity: CA = (S – I) + (T - G), which states that that the current account (CA) is equal to the sum of 
two components: private saving and primary budget surplus. 
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2.7 Summary of theoretical predictions 
 
The upshot of the theoretical overview presented in this section is roughly displayed in table (1). Most 
theoretical macroeconomic models agree on the positive effect of an expansionary fiscal policy on 
output. The responses of consumption, real wages, hours worked and the real exchange rate are model 
dependent. Theoretical models disagree on the qualitative responses of these variables. Standard 
DSGE models predict a negative effect on consumption contrary to the Keynesian model. Real wages 
increase on impact in NK DSGE models but decrease in RBC models. Typically, in a DSGE 
framework, the real exchange rate appreciates and the trade balance worsens.  
Several modelling strategies are implemented in a DSGE setup in order to generate a positive 
effect on consumption and/or a depreciation of the real exchange rate following a fiscal expansion. 
Essentially, these efforts build on the standard DSGE framework and alter the model by either 
modifying preferences, adopting non-separable utility or deep habits, or introducing two types of 
households: Ricardian and non-Ricardian, or allowing future government spending to decrease as a 
tool to reduce public debt (spending reversals).    
 
 
Table (1) Theoretical predictions on the qualitative response of key variables 
 Y C Ld Ls Real wage 
Interest 
rate 
Private 
investment 
Trade 
balance 
Real 
exchange 
rate 
Keynesian: closed economy + + +* + - + -   
Keynesian: flexible exchange rate = + = = = = = - + 
Keynesian: fixed exchange rate + + + + - = = = = 
Real business cycle + - = + - + + - + 
New Keynesian + - + + + + - - + 
Separable utility + + = + - + - - - 
Deep habits + + + + + =** - - - 
Spending reversals + + + + + + *** - - 
Note: The sign “+” indicates a positive effect and in the case of the real exchange rate an appreciation whereas the sign “-” 
indicates a negative effect and in the case of the real exchange rate a depreciation. The sign “=” indicates no effect.  
* While the Keynesian model is mute on the exact transmission mechanism that occurs in the labour market following a 
fiscal expansion, according to the Neo-Keynesian interpretation, firms demand labour up to the point where the marginal 
product of labour equals the real wage. The expansionary effect increases prices, reduces real wages. Hence, firms hire more 
labour. 
** The papers of Ravn et al. (2006; 2008) do not report the impulse response of the real interest rate to a government 
spending shock. Zubairy (2009) presents an estimated DSGE deep habits model in which the response of the interest rate is 
insignificant and indistinguishable from zero. 
** * The model of Corsetti et al. (2009) does not explicitly include private investment decisions. 
 
3 Empirical methodologies and findings 
 
As presented in the previous section, economic theory has left some key issues for empirical 
clarification, mainly the sizes of the effects, especially on output (the multiplier), and the qualitative 
response of other key variables such as consumption and the real exchange rate. Studying the 
dynamics of macroeconomic variables after a fiscal policy shock is increasingly accomplished by 
employing Vector Autoregression (VAR) models. Stock and Watson (2001) provide an accessible 
overview and Lütkepohl (2005) gives a detailed explanation of the VAR approach. This section 
presents a brief description of the treatment of fiscal policy in VAR studies and summarises recent 
empirical findings.  
 
3.1 Fiscal policy in VAR models 
 
A reduced VAR model takes the following form: 
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where the n-dimensional vector X includes the endogenous variables of interest. Mi is the n×n matrix 
of coefficients. The optimal number of included lags k can be determined by some information criteria 
such as the Akaike or Schwarz criterion. The vector of reduced form residuals et is n-dimensional with 
the variance-covariance matrix e , where   0tteeE . Earlier VAR studies, for example Blanchard 
and Perotti (2002), employ a 3-dimensional vector X = [spending output taxes]. Subsequent studies 
have extended the system to include other key variables such as inflation, private consumption, the 
real exchange rate and the interest rate. 
As stressed by Perotti (2007), the reduced form residuals capture three components: automatic 
stabilisers, discretionary fiscal policy responses (for instance systematically changing the tax rate in 
response to the business cycle) and random discretionary fiscal policy responses. The later is what the 
structural fiscal shock is meant to capture. 
The structural VAR model takes the following form: 
t
k
i
itit BvXAXA 


1
0  
The matrix A0 describes the contemporaneous relationships among the variables in the vector Xt. The 
matrix B describes the relation between the reduced form residuals te and the structural form residuals
tv :  
tt eABv 0
1  
The dynamics of the variables following a one unit increase in the current value of the structural 
residual in the fiscal equation holding all other residuals fixed (that is a "structural fiscal shock") can 
be summarised in the impulse responses of the variables included in the system.  
The challenge is how to pin down the structural shocks. To compute the impulse responses of 
the variables in the system, the matrices A0, B and the variance-covariance matrix of the structural 
residuals ( v ) must be estimated. However, the system can be identified only if some coefficients in 
the matrices 0
1AB  are restricted to take certain values typically justified by theoretical considerations 
("identifying assumptions"). Even with the assumption that the matrix B is the identity matrix, this 
exclusion restriction is not enough to identify the system. The diagonal matrix v can be used to 
express e as follows: ev AA   )( 1010 . Still, this relation does not identify a unique solution. 
 
3.1.1 Identification 
 
Perotti (2007) provides a detailed scrutiny of strategies that have been used in the literature to identify 
a fiscal policy shock. This section presents a brief overview. There are four approaches to identify 
structural fiscal shocks.  
  The first approach is the recursive formulation (Cholesky decomposition). While this strategy 
was originally proposed by Sims (1980) not in the context of identifying structural fiscal shocks, 
subsequent works have applied this identification approach to fiscal policy analysis (for example 
Corsetti and Müller 2006 and Fatas and Mihov 2001). According to this approach, the first variable 
ordered in the system responds only to its own exogenous shock. In the 3-dimensional example above, 
spending is ordered first. This implies government spending does not contemporaneously react to 
shocks to the economy. The second variable, output, responds to the first variable (spending) and its 
own shock. The third variable, taxes, reacts to its own shock and shocks to the previous two variables, 
and so on. Technically, the matrix 0A  is a lower triangular matrix with ones on the main diagonal, and 
the matrix B is the identity matrix: 
 
൥
1 0 0
ܽଶଵ 1 0ܽଷଵ ܽଷଶ 1
൩ ൥
݁௦௣௘௡ௗ௜௡௚
݁௢௨௧௣௨௧     
݁௧௔௫௘௦        
൩ ൌ ൥
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
൩ ൥
ݒ௦௣௘௡ௗ௜௡௚
ݒ௢௨௧௣௨௧     
ݒ௧௔௫௘௦        
൩ 
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In this context, the ordering of the variables plays a crucial role because it defines the direction of the 
causal relationship. Strictly, there is no theoretical guide for ordering the variables, and the 
assumptions behind any ordering are nontrivial. For instance, positioning taxes after output excludes a 
priori contemporaneous effects on any components of output including private consumption, which is 
a rather strong assumption. 
The second approach is the structural identification approach proposed by Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002), according to which some elements of the Matrix 0
1AB  can be obtained by using 
information on elasticities of spending and taxes to output. These elasticities correspond to certain 
elements in the matrix 0A . Computing these elasticities is described in Perotti (2007) and Van den 
Noord (2000). For example, based on Perotti (2007), the value of the output elasticity of net taxes (ܽଷଶ) 
for the USA is computed to be 1.85. This value is then exogenously imposed on the VAR model. In 
our example, the system then takes the following form:  
 
൥
1 0     0     
ܽଶଵ 1 ܽଶଷ
0 1.85 1
൩ ൥
݁௦௣௘௡ௗ௜௡௚
݁௢௨௧௣௨௧     
݁௧௔௫௘௦        
൩ ൌ ൥
1 0 0
0 1 0
ܾଷଵ 0 1
൩ ൥
ݒ௦௣௘௡ௗ௜௡௚
ݒ௢௨௧௣௨௧     
ݒ௧௔௫௘௦        
൩ 
 
The crucial assumption needed for this identification approach is that government spending does not 
react within a certain period, typically assumed to be a quarter, to shocks to the economy. This is 
based on the idea that fiscal actions are subject to the decision lag; i.e. the time needed for fiscal policy 
makers to respond to the status of the economy. Estimating b31 while setting b13 = 0 implies that 
spending decisions come before tax decisions. Perotti (2007) imposes further elasticities conditions 
(exogenous values) in a system that includes two additional variables: inflation and the interest rate.5 
The third approach is the sign restriction approach developed by Uhlig (2005) and applied to 
fiscal policy analysis by Mountford and Uhlig (2009) and Pappa (2009a, and 2009b). Contrary to the 
previous two approaches, the sign restriction approach does not require imposing zero 
contemporaneous effects on some variables, but requires restrictions on the sign of the impulse 
responses of the fiscal variables. For example, Mountford and Uhlig (2009) identify a government 
spending shock as a shock that is orthogonal to monetary and business cycle shocks, and for which 
government revenue increases for four quarters after the shock. Hence, they impose also sign 
restrictions to identify monetary and business cycle shocks. Pappa (2009b), by referring to RBC and 
NK DSGE models, identifies a government spending shock as a shock that contemporaneously 
increases output and the budget deficit. The use of sign restrictions for fiscal policy analysis is not 
unproblematic. Given the various competing theoretical predictions, prior information upon the 
qualitative responses of the variables can be of a limited use in this context. In fact, we are interested 
in the signs of the effects per se. Also, another potential drawback of this method is that more than one 
model may satisfy the sign restrictions for the impulse response functions but at the same time have 
different quantitative effects. Fry and Pagan (2007) and Paustian (2007) provide a detailed discussion 
on the use of sign restrictions for identification. In general, the sign restriction approach does not 
necessarily yield better estimates of the effects of the structural shocks than other approaches such as 
the SVAR approach.   
The fourth approach is the narrative (or dummy variables) approach, which is implemented in 
studies that are particularly interested in the U.S. economy. Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Ramey 
(2008) construct a dummy capturing dates of exogenous increases in government defence spending. 
These are the episodes of Vietnam War, Korean War, the Carter-Reagan build-up, and 9/11. Romer 
and Romer (forthcoming) apply the idea for legislated tax changes. 6 While several of those studies, for 
example Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Romer and Romer (forthcoming), rely on single-equation 
techniques, others such as Favero, C. and Giavazzi, F. (2009) apply this identification approach in a 
                                                 
5 One earlier seminal contribution advocating the use of SVAR is Blanchard and Quah (1989) who identify 
supply shocks as shocks that have permanent effects (long-run restrictions). However, economic theory suggests 
that fiscal policy has short-run effects. Therefore, the identification in the context of fiscal policy primarily relies 
on contemporaneous restrictions. 
6 A detailed description and timing can be found in Ramey (2008).  
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VAR setup. The fiscal shock is identified by the impulse response of the dates-dummy. Specifically, 
the new reduced form VAR is: 
tjt
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where j is the lag order associated with the dates-dummy d, and D is the associated matrix of 
coefficients. The disadvantage of this approach is that other fiscal shocks of different implications 
might have occurred parallel to the identified episodes. Further, to some extent the dynamics of all 
variables is assumed to be the same in each episode.  
 
3.1.2 Cautious interpretation 
 
The previous subsection has highlighted the complexity of identifying structural fiscal shocks. While it 
is natural to ask which of the discussed identification scheme is best suited for fiscal policy analysis, it 
is a rather delicate matter to favour one method to another as all are subject to drawbacks.  
In conjunction with the mentioned identification difficulties, fiscal actions can be anticipated 
due to the implementation lag, i.e. the period of time until the change in fiscal policy is indeed 
implemented. Theoretically, if consumers are Ricardian anticipation may yield different impulse 
responses. Perotti (2005) examines how the announced OECD forecasts of government spending and 
GDP growth affect the VAR results, and emphasises that “there is a little evidence that the VAR 
innovations are predictable, p. 13”. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Tenhofen and Wolff (2007) 
account for anticipated shocks by allowing agents at time t to fully anticipate the fiscal shock that will 
occur at time t+1. This is done by augmenting the output equation or consumption equation in the 
VAR system with expected values at time t of fiscal variables at time t+1.7 Mertens and Ravn (2009) 
extend the analysis of the narrative approach of Romer and Romer (forthcoming) to account for 
anticipation effects. They distinguish between the announcement date (the time when the legislation is 
signed) and the implementation date (the date at which tax changes are enforced). According to 
Mertens and Ravn (2009), a tax change is anticipated if the time span between these two dates is 
longer than a certain period assumed to be 90 days.  
Apart of difficulties in relation to identification and accounting for anticipation, other issues 
are under spot. Earlier VAR studies ignored the budget government constraint. Chung and Leeper 
(2007) and Favero and Giavazzi (2007) point out that omitting the debt dynamics yields biased results. 
The argument of Chung and Leeper (2007) is based upon accounting for fiscal financing. The idea is 
that following the fiscal shock the present value balance has to be achieved, and hence must be 
imposed on the VAR model by introducing the intertemporal government budget constraint. While 
Chung and Leeper (2007) introduce a linearised version of the government budget constraint into an 
otherwise standard VAR, Favero and Giavazzi (2007) argue in favour of accounting for non-linearity. 
For example, a 5-dimnsional VAR model (that adds inflation and the interest rate to the previous 3-
dimisional VAR example) represents all variables that determine the time path of the level of debt. 
However, the VAR is linear whereas the government budget constraint is a non-linear relation.  
Consequently, the accuracy of the linear approximation of the debt equation (the stationarity of debt) 
resolves whether or not the non-linear debt equation has to be included. Favero and Giavazzi (2009) 
find that in principle there are no differences between the impulse responses of U.S variables to a tax 
shock with and without the inclusion of a non-linear government budget constraint.8 Some recent 
studies such as Dungey and Fry (2009) and Bilbiie, Meier and Müller (2008) take the debt dynamics 
into consideration by including a debt equation in the VAR.  
 Another important issue is with regard to the frequency of the data. For many economies, 
there are no quarterly fiscal variables. Quarterly data are either not revised or interpolated. 
Additionally, anticipation effects become less pronounced with annual data. From this standpoint the 
use of the annual data is an advantage. However, the assumption that government spending does not 
contemporaneously react to the state of the economy becomes stronger with annual data. Furthermore, 
                                                 
7 Expectation augmented VAR gives rise to a correlation between the residuals and some explanatory variables. 
Therefore, instead of estimating every equation by OLS, some equations have to be estimated by instrumental 
variables; Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Tenhofen and Wolff (2007). 
8 Favero and Giavazzi (2009) find some differences however for the sub-sample starting from 1981 to 2006. 
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the use of annual data restricts the analysis due to shorter time series. For example, Beetsma 
Giuliodori and Klaassen (2008) employ a panel of European countries to circumvent this issue of 
degrees of freedom. However, while panel estimates can be useful to assess qualitative responses, they 
are not informative about country-specific quantitative responses of variables of interest. 
      
3.2 Overview of empirical results  
 
This section provides a summary of recent empirical evidence on the effects of fiscal policy shocks on 
macroeconomic aggregates. It is important to note that the results reviewed below are not directly 
comparable. The studies differ not only with respect to the identification strategies but are also based 
on the inclusion of different variables, stochastic and deterministic components, different sample 
periods, different numbers of chosen lags and other details. Also, studies differ in the exact employed 
government expenditure and tax series. Government spending is the sum of government consumption 
and government investment. In addition, government spending is categorised according to government 
functions such as defence spending, pension etc. The series of government revenue from taxation has 
also to be constructed from various components.9   
Since most studies report several magnitudes of the same effect scaled with different units, this 
summary focuses on the qualitative effects obtained from benchmark results. An exception is the 
multiplier on output, which is reported according to benchmark estimates on impact; if applicable.    
 
3.2.1 The response of output, consumption, labour market and the interest rate 
 
Table (2) summarises recent VAR findings on the impacts of a positive government spending shock 
while table (3) summarises recent VAR findings on the impacts of a tax shock on key macroeconomic 
aggregates. Details on the construction of fiscal variables, on cumulative, peak responses and the exact 
shapes of the impulse response functions of the key variables can be found in the corresponding 
studies. The results are as follows: 
Output response: Regardless of the chosen identification approach, several VAR studies report an 
increase in output in a hump-shaped manner as a result of a positive government spending shock; for 
example Blanchard and Perotti (2002), De Castro and De Cos (2008), Fatas and Mihov (2001) and 
Pappa (2009b). However, the size of the impact and the peak response vary across studies. In fact, 
even within many studies the size of the multiplier is dependent on the employed specification or the 
sample period. Notably, the multiplier is negative for some sub-samples for Australia, Canada and the 
UK; Perotti (2005). For the U.S. economy Perotti (2005) stresses that the effects of fiscal shocks on 
GDP and its components have declined in the last twenty years. Bilbiie, Meier and Müller (2008) 
explain this by the role of increased participation in the asset market and more active monetary policy. 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) find no evidence on changes in the response of output due to an 
anticipation of the shock. The multiplier even gets larger. Concerning a tax shock, Blanchard Perotti 
(2002) find that a tax increase has a negative impact multiplier of about 0.7 in the US. Results based 
on the sign restriction or narrative approach confirm this negative multiplier; Caldara and Kamps 
(2008), Mountford and Uhlig (2009) and Romer and Romer (forthcoming). However, as in the case of 
a spending shock, the sign of the multiplier changes depending on the sample period for some OECD 
economies; Perotti (2005). Accounting for anticipation by Mertens and Ravn (2009) yields a negative 
multiplier for an anticipated tax cut in the period before implementation. Afterwards, output increases. 
The results summarised in tables (2) and (3) do not provide unambiguous evidence that the multiplier 
of a tax cut is smaller than that of an increase in government spending as the Keynesian theory 
predicts. Arin and Koray (2006) distinguish between different series of tax revenues. They find that 
positive income tax shocks have a negative effect on output whereas positive corporate income tax 
shocks have a surprisingly positive effect on output in Canada. This indicates that using an aggregate 
series of tax revenues might be misleading since changes in different tax categories may have different 
implications on the economy. 
                                                 
9 Our focus is on recent estimates (especially VAR studies) of the multipliers and short-run effects of fiscal 
shokcs on key variables. A popular strand of the literature in the 90s attempts to estimate potential effects of 
fiscal policy on long-run economic growth rates; see for instance Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1998).  
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Consumption response: The results are not clear-cut. Studies using the recursive or Blanchard-
Perotti identification approach find that a positive government spending shock has a positive effect on 
consumption; for instance Fatas and Mihov (2001) and Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Using the sign 
restriction approach, Pappa (2009b) reports also a positive effect on consumption in contrast to 
Mountford and Uhlig (2009) who find that the response of consumption is zero and insignificant. The 
narrative approach of Ramey (2008) yields a negative effect on consumption. Thus far, the narrative 
approach of identification is exclusively applied to the U.S. economy. After accounting for 
anticipation of the fiscal shock, consumption also declines in the study by Tenhofen and Wollf (2007). 
Thus, VAR estimates do not provide full support in favour of one theoretical prediction on 
consumption against another. This is true also in the case of a tax shock. Nevertheless, overall 
consumption seems to increase as a result of a tax cut in several studies such as Blanchard and Perotti 
(2002) and Romer and Romer (forthcoming). A non-positive response of consumption is found in for 
example in studies such as Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Ramey (2008) and Tenhofen and Wolff (2007) 
which can be interpreted as studies capturing anticipation effects. Linking the reported results in tables 
(2) and (3) to the theory, overall, the recursive and Blanchard and Perotti approaches support the 
Keynesian and modified DSGE models (for example the deep habits and the spending reversals model) 
in which consumption respond positively to a fiscal expansion. The results of studies that employ the 
narrative approach seem to be in line with the standard forward Ricardian behaviour. 
Labour market response: Concerning the reaction of employment, Burnside, Eichenbaum and 
Fisher (2004), Pappa (2009a) and Ramey (2007) document an increase in employment following a 
positive spending shock. This is in line with the reaction of output and the various theories 
summarised in table (1) since no model predicts a decrease in employment following a positive fiscal 
shock. Few studies consider the reaction of the real wage (results are not reported in tables (2) or (3)). 
The results are mixed. Pappa (2009a) and Blanchard and Perotti (2002) report an increase while 
Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) report a decrease in the real wage in response to a positive 
spending shock. 
Interest rate response: The interest rate increases following a fiscal expansion according to several 
empirical studies such as Ramey (2008) in line with predictions of DSGE models and a closed 
economy Keynesian model. In Caldara and Kamps (2008), the interest rate does not react. The finding 
of some VAR studies of a negative impact of a fiscal expansion on the interest rate is rather difficult to 
interpret theoretically.  
In connection to the estimates reviewed in tables (2) and (3), Laubach (2009) using a one-equation 
econometric methodology, estimates that a one percentage point increase in projected deficit-to-GDP 
ratio in the US, ceteris paribus, increases long-term interest rates by 20 to 30 basis points. In the 
European Monetary Union, Faini (2006) reports that a fall in the primary surplus of a member country 
raises its interest rate by about 3 basis points. 
 
Table (2) The effects of a government spending shock* 
Study Country Sample Identification strategy Output Consumption Employment 
Interest 
rate Comments 
Beetsma et al. 
(2008) 
Panel 
EU14 
annual 
1970-2004 recursive 1.2     
Bilbiie et al. 
(2008) 
USA quarterly 1983-2004 recursive 0.94 +   
the reported 
multiplier is a 4 
quarters 
cumulative 
response 
USA quarterly 1957-1979 recursive 1.71 +   
Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002) 
 
USA quarterly 1960-1997 
Blanchard 
and Perotti 0.84 +    
USA quarterly 1960-1997 
expectation 
augmented ca 2     
Burnside et al. 
(2004) 
 
USA quarterly 1947-1995 narrative + = +   
Caldara and 
Kamps (2008) 
USA quarterly 1955-2006 recursive 1 + = =  
USA quarterly 1955-2006 
Blanchard 
and Perotti 1 + = =  
USA quarterly 1955-2006 
sign 
restrictions ca 0.5 = = =  
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USA quarterly 1955-2006 narrative 0 + = =  
De Castro 
and De Cos 
(2008) 
Spain quarterly  
Blanchard 
and Perotti 1.31 +  + 
the reported 
multiplier is a 4 
quarters 
cumulative 
response 
Dungey and 
Fry (2009) 
New 
Zealand 
quarterly 
1983-2006 
sign 
restrictions + -  + 
the identification 
method 
combines SVAR 
restrictions on 
non-fiscal 
variables and 
sing restrictions 
on fiscal shocks 
Fatas and 
Mihov (2001) USA 
quarterly 
1960-1996 recursive 0.3  + + + 
peak multiplier 
in 2 years 
Favero and 
Giavazzi 
(2007) 
USA quarterly 1980-2006 
Blanchard 
and Perotti 0.127   - 
the reported 
multiplier is a 4 
quarters 
cumulative 
response; after 
accounting for 
debt dynamics 
USA quarterly 1960-1979 
Blanchard 
and Perotti 0.056   - 
Galí et al. 
(2007) USA 
quarterly 
1954-2003 
Blanchard 
and Perotti 0.78 + +   
Giordano et 
al. (2007) Italy 
quarterly 
1982-2004 
Blanchard 
and Perotti 0.2 + + - 
interest rate 
increases after 
about one year 
Heppke-Falk 
et al. (2006) Germany 
quarterly 
1974-2004 
Blanchard 
and Perotti 0.62 +  +  
Mountford 
and Uhlig 
(2009) 
USA Quarterly 1955-2000 
sign 
restrictions 0.44 =  =  
Pappa (2009a) 
 
 
USA annual 1969-2001 
sign 
restrictions   +   
Pappa 
(2009b) 
Canada quarterly 1970-2007 
sign 
restrictions 0.18 + +  
results reported 
for a government 
consumption 
shock. Pappa 
(2009b) reports 
results for 
government 
investment and 
employment 
shocks 
EU 
aggregate 
quarterly 
1991-2007 
sign 
restrictions 0.16 + +  
Japan quarterly 1970-2007 
sign 
restrictions 0.13 + +  
UK quarterly 1970-2007 
sign 
restrictions 0.13 + +  
USA quarterly 1970-2007 
sign 
restrictions 0.74 + +  
Perotti (2005) 
 
Australia quarterly 1980-2001 
Blanchard 
and Perotti .21 +  + 
the reported 
multiplier is a 4 
quarters 
cumulative 
response 
Australia quarterly 1960-1979 
Blanchard 
and Perotti -0.1 +  - 
Canada quarterly 1980-2001 
Blanchard 
and Perotti -.28 -  + 
Canada quarterly 1960-1979 
Blanchard 
and Perotti 0.59 +  + 
Germany quarterly 1975-1989 
Blanchard 
and Perotti .4 -  - 
Germany quarterly 1960-1974 
Blanchard 
and Perotti 0.41 -  + 
UK quarterly 1980-2001 
Blanchard 
and Perotti -.2 -  + 
UK quarterly 1960-1979 
Blanchard 
and Perotti 0.48 +  + 
USA quarterly 1980-2001 
Blanchard 
and Perotti .31 +  + 
USA quarterly 1960-1979 
Blanchard 
and Perotti 1.13 +  - 
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Perotti (2007) 
Canada quarterly 1947-2005 
Blanchard 
and Perotti   -   
UK quarterly 1947-2005 
Blanchard 
and Perotti   -   
USA quarterly 1947-2005 
Blanchard 
and Perotti   +   
Ramey (2008) USA quarterly 1947-2003 narrative ca 1 - + +  
Ramey and 
Shapiro 
(1998) 
USA quarterly 1947-1996 narrative ca  1  - = - 
interest rate falls 
on impact but 
increases later 
Ravn et al. 
(2007) 
 
A panel 
of 
Australia, 
Canada, 
UK and 
the USA 
quarterly 
1975-2005 
Blanchard 
and Perotti 0.52 +    
Tenhofen and 
Wolff (2007) USA 
quarterly 
1947-2006 
expectation 
augmented  -    
* If the study does not consider a certain variable, the corresponding field in the table is kept empty. Further, if not otherwise 
stated, the reported magnitude of the multiplier is on impact. The cumulative peak response is usually larger than the impact 
effect. Details on cumulative and peak responses of output and other key variables can be found in the corresponding study. 
The sign “+” indicates a positive effect whereas the sign “-” indicates a negative effect. The sign “=” indicates no effect.  
 
Table (3) The effects of a tax shock* 
Study Country Data 
Increase 
or 
decrease 
Identification 
strategy Output Consumption Employment 
Interest 
rate Comments 
Arin and 
Koray (2006) Canada 
quarterly 
1960-
1999 
increase recursive -   - 
Shock to 
income tax 
revenues 
Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002) 
USA 
quarterly 
1960-
1997 
increase Blanchard and Perotti -0.69 -    
USA 
quarterly 
1960-
1997 
increase expectation augmented ca 0     
Caldara and 
Kamps (2008) 
USA 
quarterly 
1955-
2006 
increase recursive 0 = = =  
USA 
quarterly 
1955-
2006 
increase Blanchard and Perotti 0 = = =  
USA 
quarterly 
1955-
2006 
increase sign restrictions -0.8 - = =  
De Castro 
and De Cos 
(2008) 
Spain 
quarterly 
1980-
2004 
increase Blanchard and Perotti - +  +  
Dungey and 
Fry (2009) 
New 
Zealand 
quarterly 
1983-
2006 
increase sign restrictions 
 
+ -  + 
the 
identification 
method 
combines 
SVAR 
restrictions on 
non-fiscal 
variables and 
sing 
restrictions on 
fiscal shocks 
Favero and 
Giavazzi 
(2007) 
 
USA 
quarterly 
1980-
2006 
increase Blanchard and Perotti 0.016   + 
the reported 
multiplier is a 
4 quarters 
cumulative 
response; after 
accounting for 
debt dynamics 
USA 
quarterly 
1960-
1979 
increase Blanchard and Perotti -0.249   - 
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Giordano  
et al. (2007) Italy 
quarterly 
1982-
2004 
increase Blanchard and Perotti +  + +  
Mountford  
and Uhlig 
(2009) 
USA 
quarterly 
1955-
2000 
decrease sign restrictions 0.19 +  - 
deficit financed 
tax cut 
Mertens and 
Ravn (2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
USA 
quarterly 
1947-
2006 
decrease narrative peak of 2.17 in 10 quarters + +  
results for an 
unanticipated 
tax cut  
USA 
quarterly 
1947-
2006 
decrease narrative 
nadir of -1.16 
three quarters 
before 
implementation 
= -  
results for  an 
anticipated tax 
cut and before 
implementation 
Perotti (2005) 
Australia 
quarterly 
1980-
2001 
decrease Blanchard and Perotti -0.36 -  -  
Australia 
quarterly 
1960-
1979 
decrease Blanchard and Perotti -0.41 -  - 
the reported 
multiplier is a 
4 quarters 
cumulative 
response 
Canada 
quarterly 
1980-
2001 
decrease Blanchard and Perotti 0.3 +  - 
Canada 
quarterly 
1960-
1979 
decrease Blanchard and Perotti -0.03 +  + 
Germany 
quarterly 
1975-
1989 
decrease Blanchard and Perotti 0.02 -  + 
Germany 
quarterly 
1960-
1974 
decrease Blanchard and Perotti -0.22 +  - 
UK 
quarterly 
1980-
2001 
decrease Blanchard and Perotti -0.23 -  + 
UK 
quarterly 
1960-
1979 
decrease Blanchard and Perotti 0.10 +  + 
USA 
quarterly 
1980-
2001 
decrease Blanchard and Perotti -0.43 -  - 
USA 
quarterly 
1960-
1979 
decrease Blanchard and Perotti 0.69 +  - 
Romer and 
Romer 
(forthcoming) 
USA 
quarterly 
1950-
2007 
increase narrative -3 percent of GDP  -   
the reported 
multiplier is a 
peak response 
over 3 years 
* If the study does not consider a certain variable, the corresponding field in the table is kept empty. Further, if not otherwise stated, the 
reported magnitude of the multiplier is on impact. The cumulative peak response is usually larger than the impact effect. Details on 
cumulative and peak responses of output and other key variables can be found in the corresponding study. The sign “+” indicates a 
positive effect whereas the sign “-” indicates a negative effect. The sign “=” indicates no effect. 
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Table (4) The impact of a fiscal shock on the real exchange rate and the current account* 
Study Country A shock to Identification 
Real 
exchange 
rate 
Terms of trade 
(relative price 
of imports) 
Relative 
price 
of non-
traded 
goods 
Net exports 
or current 
account 
Beetsma et 
al. (2008) 
Panel 
EU14 
government 
spending recursive +   - 
Blanchard 
and Perotti 
(2002) 
USA government spending 
Blanchard 
and Perotti    - 
Corsetti and 
Müller 
(2006) 
Australia budget balance recursive  +  + 
Canada budget balance recursive  -  - 
UK budget balance recursive  -  - 
USA budget balance recursive  -  + 
Kim and 
Roubini 
(2008) 
USA budget balance recursive -   + 
Monacelli 
and Perotti 
(forthcoming) 
Australia government spending 
Blanchard 
and Perotti -  - - 
Canada government spending 
Blanchard 
and Perotti -  - = 
UK government spending 
Blanchard 
and Perotti -  - - 
USA government spending 
Blanchard 
and Perotti - 
+ (impact) 
- (cumulative) - - 
Monacelli 
and Perotti 
(2008) 
USA government spending 
Blanchard 
and Perotti  + -  
 
Müller 
(2008) 
USA government spending recursive  +  + 
Ravn et al. 
(2007) 
A panel of 
Australia, 
Canada, 
UK and 
the US. 
government 
spending recursive -   - 
* If the study does not consider a certain variable, the corresponding field in the table is kept empty. Further, if not otherwise 
stated, the reported magnitude of the multiplier is on impact. The cumulative response may differ from the impact effect. 
Details on cumulative and peak responses can be found in the corresponding study. The sign “+” indicates a positive effect 
whereas the sign “-” indicates a negative effect. The sign “=” indicates no effect. 
 
3.2.2 The response of external sector variables 
 
Table (4) summarises the results of studies with a focal interest on the dynamics of external sector 
variables resulting from a fiscal policy shock. 
The response of the real exchange rate and other relative prices: In most empirical studies, an 
expansionary fiscal shock causes depreciation of the real exchange rate; for example Monacelli and 
Perotti (forthcoming). This finding cannot be reconciled with Keynesian and standard DSGE 
predications. It is consistent however with modified DSGE models (for example the model with deep 
habits). The terms-of-trade (i.e. the relative price of imports) appreciate in Monacelli and Perotti 
(forthcoming) but depreciate in Müller (2008). The relative price of non-traded goods depreciates 
following a fiscal expansion; Monacelli and Perotti (forthcoming). 
The response of net exports and the current account (twin deficit hypothesis): Beetsma, Giuliodori 
and Klaassen (2008) using a European panel and Monacelli and Perotti (forthcoming) employing US 
data provide support in favour of the twin deficit hypothesis. On the contrary, the results of Kim and 
Roubini (2008) do not support this view for the U.S. economy. Corsetti and Müller (2006) distinguish 
between small open economies, such as Canada, for which there is evidence of the twin deficit 
hypothesis, and relatively closed economies, the US, for which there is no support for the twin deficit 
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hypothesis. In this context, there is a large older literature that examines the response of the trade 
balance and the current account to fiscal policy via estimating a single equation rather than a system of 
VAR. Lane and Perotti (1998) examine whether fiscal policy effects on the trade balance in OECD 
countries vary depending on the exchange rate regimes. They conclude that a fiscal expansion worsens 
the trade balance especially under a flexible exchange rate regime. 
 
3.2.3 Empirical evidence on fiscal policy externalities 
 
As discussed in the theoretical overview, cross-border effects of domestic fiscal changes can occur 
through affecting international trade, the interest rate and the exchange rate. Fiscal policy externality 
in the Euro Area has been the subject of several empirical studies. Faini (2006) investigates fiscal 
policy spill-over in the European Monetary Union through the interest rate channel by using single 
equation panel techniques. According to his finding, a 1 percent decrease in the primary surplus of a 
member country increases the interest rate of a typical member by 41 basis points. Overall, the 
evidence supports the interest rate channel of fiscal externalities; a fiscal expansion in one member 
country increases the union-wide interest rate.   
Beetsma, Giuliodori and Klaassen (2006) address the trade channel of externalities in two 
steps. First, they estimate the effect of a fiscal expansion by means of a (European) panel VAR. 
Second, they impose homogeneity restrictions concerning the reaction of output and plug these 
estimates in a trade-gravity type of equation. The results suggest, for example, that an increase in 
German public spending of one percent of GDP raises the exports of the rest of the European countries 
in the sample by 2.2 percent boosting their income by about 0.15 percent. 
In contrast to the previous two studies, Hebous and Zimmermann (2010) employ an integrated 
approach, the Global Vector Autoregression (GVAR), to estimate spillover effects of a budget deficit 
shock in one member in the Euro Area into the rest of the currency union. This approach derives a 
large multi-country system treating all variable as endogenous. 10 Hebous and Zimmermann (2010) 
find that the expansionary domestic effects of a budget deficit shock on output in one member country 
are much smaller compared to the effects resulting from an area-wide shock (a weighted average of 
the shocks across the Euro Area countries). This may indicate to the importance of coordinated fiscal 
actions at the level of the Euro Area. 
While the above mentioned works focus on fiscal policy externalities in the EU, Arin and 
Koray (2009) consider the transmission of fiscal shocks from the US to Canada. They find a negative 
effect of U.S. government spending shocks on Canadian output while U.S. tax shocks have no 
significant effects on Canadian output. 
 
3.2.4 A comment on macroeconometric models 
  
International and national policy institutions rely on large scale macroeconometric (structural) models 
to give a quantitative assessment of a simulated policy change. Typically, these models are, to various 
degrees, a hybrid of theory and practice. Some popular models largely extend the standard DSGE 
models in order to fit the data. 
Perotti (2005) indicates that VAR point estimates of the multiplier are in general smaller or 
equal to those obtained from macroeconometric models for the US economy. However, Cogan, 
Cwik, Taylor and Wieland (forthcoming) provide a sceptical quantitative assessment of the size of the 
multiplier typically cited for the US economy by comparing the predictions of different 
macroeconomic models including the model of Smets and Wouters (2003). Further computational 
experiments can be found in Uhlig (2009) who complements the work of Cogan, Cwik, Taylor and 
Wieland (forthcoming) by focusing on the role of distortionary taxes. Uhlig (2009) concludes that the 
initial positive effect of the government spending multiplier comes at the cost of reducing output in 
subsequent periods. Further, this cost of potentially declining output is lower in the case of a tax cut 
than an increase government spending. 
 Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust (2005) calibrate one of the Fed’s models to the U.S. economy to 
examine the effects of an expansionary fiscal shock on the U.S. trade balance. According to their 
                                                 
10 The GVAR is a multi-country VAR model developed by Pesaran, Schuermann and Weiner (2004) to examine 
the effects of global risks on a bank’s loan portfolio. 
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findings, a 1 percent increase in the ratio of government spending to GDP induces a 0.2 percentage 
points decreases in the trade balance ratio. Cwik and Wieland (2009) find no support for positive 
spillover effects of fiscal expansion within the Euro Area. An overview of earlier results of some 
popular macroeconometric models can be found in Hemming, Kell and Mahfouz (2002) and in Henry, 
de Cos and Momigliano (2008) for Europe. 
Finally, official agencies forecast expenditures and revenue associated with a proposed policy 
change. Forecasts that take into account feedback effects are known as dynamic scoring; Auerbach 
(2005). There are recent attempts to reconcile dynamic scoring with economic theory. For example, as 
stressed by Mankiw and Weinzierl (2005) and Leeper and Yang (2007), a tax cut can partially finance 
itself by generating economic growth and extending the tax base.   
 
4 Conclusion 
 
Robert Barro (2009) writes “There are reasons to think that the war-based multiplier of 0.8 
substantially overstates the multiplier that applies to peacetime …..when I attempted to estimate 
directly the multiplier associated with peacetime government purchases, I got a number insignificantly 
different from zero ”. Paul Krugman (2008) writes “…I conclude that the stimulus package should be 
at least 4% of GDP”. 
These two quotes adumbrate the debate. No surprise, as it is reviewed in this essay. Empirics 
in imperfect accord steer competing economic models. Empirical and VAR techniques endeavour to 
clarify what an economic model should predict. These attempts are confronted with the difficult task 
of isolating the fiscal effect from other disturbances. The overall picture of the available evidence from 
VAR studies can be summarised as follows. Output increases following the expansionary fiscal shock; 
there are some exceptions though. The magnitude of the effect depends on the country under 
consideration and the sample period. This finding is consistent with the Keynesian and most DSGE 
models. Consumption increases in most studies particularly in those that tend to capture unanticipated 
shocks. Although this finding indicates a Keynesian effect, consumption decreases or shows no 
significant effect in empirical studies that tend to capture anticipated shocks in line with theories of 
forward looking behaviour. Furthermore, employment seems to increase following an expansionary 
fiscal shock. The reactions of the real wage and interest rate are not clear-cut making it difficult to 
draw support in favour or against a particular model. The real exchange rate depreciates following an 
expansionary fiscal shock in several studies contradicting Keynesian and standard DSGE models 
perditions. An expansionary fiscal shock has a negative effect on the trade balance and the current 
account in some studies while the effect is muted in others.   
In the end, is a fiscal expansion effective in stimulating the economy? The answer is: “it 
depends”. Notwithstanding mixed results, one may conclude that the there is no persuasive empirical 
evidence that fiscal stimuli harm the economy or a persuasive evidence on what would have happened 
without the fiscal expansion. After all, several results point to a stimulating effect of a fiscal expansion. 
However, one may also legitimately question the interpretation of the available results and stress the 
limitation in drawing unambiguous implications. In anticipation of the persuasive conclusion, the 
reader may ask himself am I Ricardian? And the investor may ask herself will a government fiscal 
expansion crowd out my investment?  
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